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A B S T R A C T
Previous research has shown that there are significant task-switching costs even when participants have time to
prepare for task switching after cueing. We investigated individual differences in task switching by monitoring
errors and response times of individual participants. In Experiment 1A, 58 participants were encouraged to finish
the session early by completing 200 consecutive trials without making an error. In case of a mistake, they had to
repeat their effort until the experimental session expired. Using this demanding procedure, 16 participants man-
aged to complete early. Among these 16 we identified 9 best performers who showed no significant switch costs.
We conducted follow-up Experiment 1B on these best performers by systematically varying cue-stimulus inter-
vals and inter-trial intervals. The results confirmed that these participants had no significant RT and ER switch
costs when they had time to prepare the task between cue and target onset. However, significant switch costs
emerged when cue and target stimulus were presented simultaneously. In Experiment 1C, using three classical
task-switching paradigms, we compared the best performers with 9 controls who had made frequent errors in
Experiment 1A. Although the best performers responded faster and made fewer errors, they only showed reduced
switch costs in a pre-cued paradigm that had been extensively practiced. In two other paradigms with simultane-
ous presentation of cue and target stimulus, best performers had switch costs and showed considerable individual
differences similar to the controls. We conclude that there are considerable individual differences in task switch-
ing and that smaller individual switch costs are mainly related to efficient task preparation. We speculate that
efficient task preparation may be linked to better executive control and general intelligence.
1. Introduction
It is a well-established finding that switching between tasks slows re-
sponses and increases error rates (Kiesel et al., 2010; Vandierendonck,
Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010). This cost of switching can be reduced
by longer preparation intervals (e.g., Altmann, 2004), predictable task
switches (e.g. Monsell, Sumner, & Waters, 2003; Rogers & Monsell,
1995), pre-cueing that informs about the upcoming task at the be-
ginning of each trial (e.g, Meiran, 1996; Meiran,
Chorev, & Sapir, 2000) and extensive practice of task rules (e.g., Meiran
et al., 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Stoet & Snyder, 2007). However,
studies consistently reported significant “residual” switch costs (e.g.,
Meiran et al., 2000; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002; Rogers & Monsell,
1995; Schneider, 2016, 2017) and these residual switch costs may re-
flect incomplete reconfiguration processes during task switching.
It has been suggested that there are two separate stages of task re-
configuration in task switching (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell,
1995; Rubinstein, Meyer, & Evans, 2001): an early goal-reconfigura-
tion stage that can be trig
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gered as soon as participants are cued about the task, and a second
rule-activation stage that only starts when the target stimulus is pre-
sented. Residual switch costs reflect the second rule-activation stage
where participants wait for the target stimulus before they can execute
a specific task rule. This account has been supported by a number of
recent studies (e.g., Hydock & Sohn, 2011; Weidler & Abrams, 2013).
Nonetheless, the assumption that residual switch costs arise from the
postponed completion of reconfiguration has been challenged.
According to De Jong's (2000) failure-to-engage account on task-set
preparation, participants either prepare for the upcoming task or fail to
do so. In trials in which active preparation occurs, the residual switch
costs disappear because advance preparation is complete before the tar-
get stimulus is presented. In other trials, however, advance prepara-
tion is incomplete when the target stimulus is presented, and this may
occur even after extended preparation intervals. Residual switch costs
are therefore a consequence of participants who occasionally fail to en-
gage in the preparation process. As De Jong (2000) pointed out, re-
sponse time distributions of task-switch trials should reflect a mixture
of prepared and unprepared processing states (see also Nieuwenhuis &
Monsell, 2002; Poboka, Karayanidis, & Heathcote, 2014). This implies
that performance in fully prepared task-switch trials should be similar to
performance in task-repeat trials. In line with this, Poboka et al. (2014),
for example, reported that switch and repeat trials had very similar RT
distributions in conditions with long cue-target intervals.
If residual switch costs arise from a failure-to-engage during prepa-
ration, then it may be possible to eliminate residual switch costs by im-
proving task preparation. Attempts to eliminate residual switch costs
focused on increasing participants' motivation in order to fully engage
them in advance preparation. For example, Nieuwenhuis and Monsell
(2002) used visual feedback and payoffs after each block in order to re-
duce response times. In addition, they used blocks of only 16 trials in
order to minimize fatigue and to sustain advance preparation through-
out each block. Nonetheless, they still found substantial residual switch
costs, the difference in mean RTs between switch and repeat trials, of
+69ms.
Another method to reduce residual switch costs was deployed by
Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, and Demanet (2007). They
were able to improve participants' task preparation by reducing the cue
presentation time. Residual switch costs were smaller and non-signif-
icant when the cue was removed after a brief presentation of 96ms
rather than remaining present throughout each trial (see their Experi-
ments 2, 3, and 4). Verbruggen et al. (2007) concluded that by using
only a briefly presented cue participants were more likely to process
the cue and therefore complete preparation for an upcoming task switch
within cue-stimulus intervals (CSIs) of more than 1sec (see also Experi-
ment 3 in Proctor, Koch, Vu, & Yamaguchi, 2008). However, Schneider
(2016, Experiment 5) was unable to replicate the results of Verbruggen
et al. (2007) and instead found large and significant residual switch
costs when the cue was followed by a mask, similar to a condition where
the cue was visible for the entire CSI and remained present after target
onset. These contrasting findings suggest that residual switch costs are
not just modulated by cue availability during CSIs.
More recently, Schneider (2017) tried to modulate residual switch
costs by increasing participants' phasic alertness — a form of atten-
tion that is described by rapid and brief changes in sensitivity to exter-
nal stimulation (Posner, 1978, 2008; Posner & Boies, 1971). Schneider
(2017) inserted an alerting stimulus shortly before target stimulus onset
in some trials and compared them to trials with no such alert. He found
shorter RTs in trials with alert compared to trials without alert, suggest-
ing that general task performance can be improved by increased phasic
alertness. However, he found no evidence that phasic alertness reduced
residual switch costs.
There are two potential limitations in studies that have tried to re-
move switch costs (Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002; Schneider, 2016,
2017; Verbruggen et al., 2007). The first limitation is that experimen-
tal manipulations in conventional task-switching paradigms may affect
participants differently. Previous task-switching research has demon-
strated that significant residual switch costs remained despite various
attempts to eliminate them. However, the question whether all individ-
uals show switch costs or not has not been addressed? This is similar
to the general question posed by Haaf and Rouder (2017, 2018): Does
everyone show the same effect in a cognitive task? More specifically, in
a typical task-switching experiment, do individual participants have the
same switch costs? Individual differences in task-switching may be ob-
scured when reporting averaged group performance. There is evidence
that some participants learn to switch between tasks better than others,
showing striking individual differences in their task-switching perfor-
mance (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007). More recently, Watson and Strayer
(2010, 2012) reported “super-taskers” (2.5% of the sample) who demon-
strated extraordinary high levels of cognitive competence in dual-tasks,
and showed more efficient brain activity in the attentional control net-
work (Medeiros-Ward, Watson, & Strayer, 2014). These findings chal-
lenge previous studies that have tried to eliminate switch costs but only
report group performances.
It seems possible that not every participant shows switch costs be-
cause participants may have different trait-like switching abilities or
may be motivated differently in more demanding experimental settings.
We surmised that a few “super-switchers” may be hidden in a larger
sample. “Super-switchers”, if they exist, should exhibit minimal or zero
switch costs independent of experimental conditions. Moreover, they
should outperform others in terms of accuracy. In order to find out
whether “super-switchers” exist, we report not only average group per-
formances but investigate individual differences in task-switching per-
formance.
The second limitation of previous studies is that despite successful
manipulations of cue presentation times (Schneider, 2016; Verbruggen
et al., 2007), alerting stimuli (Schneider, 2017) and feedback
(Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002), we cannot be sure that participants
processed all task information and exerted the same effort in each
trial. Researchers typically assume that participants are fully engaged
and motivated but previous results suggest that participants are un-
able to prepare for the task set in each upcoming trial (Lien, Ruthruff,
Remington, & Johnston, 2005) and pay more attention to task-set
changes in some trials than in others (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De
Jong, 2010).
In order to motivate participants to prepare the task set in each
upcoming trial we used a novel procedure that encourages partici-
pants to engage in every single trial for an
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extended period. In Experiment 1A, participants were asked to finish the
experiment early by making no error in a block of 200 consecutive trials
with two randomly intermixed tasks. We suggest that this “zero-error
policy” would motivate participants to fully concentrate on the task and
reduce “failure to engage”.
In summary, the present study sought to investigate how participants
differ in their task-switching performance using different tasks, condi-
tions and paradigms, with particular focus on individual task-switching
costs.
2. Experiment 1A
Experiment 1A aimed to study individual differences in task-switch-
ing using a highly-demanding procedure. In contrast to conventional
task-switching experiments with a fixed number of experimental trials,
we asked participants to keep trying until they completed 200 consec-
utive trials in a mixed-task block without committing a single mistake.
Alternatively, testing continued until the experimental session exceeded
90min. We asked participants to keep practicing the tasks for up to
90min as previous studies have found improved switching performance
after extended training (Merian et al., 2000; Rogers & Monsell, 1995;
Stoet & Snyder, 2007).
We assumed that asking participants to complete the experiment by
making no error in 200 trials would heighten participants’ alertness and
motivation over each consecutive trial. In addition, this method pro-
vides a series of RT measurements that are not confounded by intermit-
tent errors (Houtman, Castellar, & Notebaert, 2012; Regev & Meiran,
2014; Van der Borght, Braem, Stevens, & Notebaert, 2016).
Based on previous research on individual differences in cognitive
performance (Haff & Rouder, 2017, 2018; Medeiros-Ward et al., 2014;
Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007; Strayer & Watson, 2012; Watson & Strayer,
2010, 2012), we anticipated that participants would perform differently
in task-switching. We expected that a few highly-engaged participants
may reach 100% accuracy in their best-performing block and show no
apparent RT switch costs. Other participants may perform more poorly,
making frequent errors in the mixed-task block, showing significant
switch costs, or both.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Subjects
We recruited a total of 62 students from the University of Glasgow
and Caledonian University. We tried to establish a reasonably large sam-
ple that would represent typical task-switching participants including
highly-engaged participants and possibly a few “super-switchers”. All
participants received a small reward for taking part and were entered
into a prize draw to win a £5, £10, or £20. Two participants had to be
excluded because they quit the experiment before completing the study.
We also excluded two poorly performing participants because they only
achieved a maximum of three trials in their mixed blocks. The 14 male
and 44 female students in the remaining sample of 58 participants were
between 20 and 34years old (M=25.0years, SD=3.1). All participants
passed a color-blindness test (Ishihara, 1983), and they were naive with
respect to the task-switching paradigm and experimental hypotheses.
2.1.2. Apparatus
The experiment was conducted in a quiet and dimly-lit laboratory.
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen at a viewing dis-
tance of approximately 57cm. The experiment was programmed using
PsyToolkit software (an open access software toolbox for programming
psychological experiments based on Linux operating systems; Stoet,
2010, 2017) and run on a PC with a 24-inch screen. In order to im-
prove response time measurement, a Black Box toolkit (BBTK) response
pad was used to record button-press responses with millisecond preci-
sion. Two of the four white buttons on the response pad were used to
record responses. All data were analyzed in R version 3.4.2 (R Core
Team, 2017).
2.1.3. Stimuli and tasks
We employed a pre-cued color/shape task-switching paradigm. Both
cues and stimuli were displayed on a black background. The task cues
were displayed at the center of the screen. The cues were white isosce-
les triangles with side length of 35mm and base length of or 42mm. A
triangle pointing upwards indicated a color task and a triangle point-
ing downwards indicated a shape task. We used four different rectan-
gles as target stimuli: a vertically elongated (high) red or green bar, a
horizontally elongated (wide) red or green bar. The size of the stim-
uli varied randomly across trials, with the shorter side ranging between
6.6 and 33mm and the elongated side ranging between 46 and 73mm.
The RGB color of the stimuli also varied randomly across trials (red,
green, and blue channels could range between 0 and 255, as is stan-
dard in many computer applications). For the red stimuli, the red chan-
nel value ranged between 200 and 255 whereas the green channel value
equaled blue channel value varying between 0 and 100. For the green
stimuli, the green channel value ranged between 200 and 255 whereas
the red channel value equaled blue channel value varying between 0
and 100. The purpose of the variation in color and size of the target
stimuli was to encourage participants to use general task rules when
making responses rather than recalling specific cue-stimulus-response
associations from a “lookup table” (Forrest, Monsell, & McLaren, 2014;
Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007). Participants used the same pair of response
keys for both tasks (see Fig. 1) resulting in congruent and incongru-
ent trials. In congruent trials, both task-relevant and task-irrelevant tar-
get features lead to the same (correct) response in both tasks. In in-
congruent trials the distracting target features, if erroneously attended
to, would result in a slower or incorrect response (cf., Kiesel, Wendt, &
Peters, 2007).
2.1.4. Procedure
An experimental session lasted up to 90min. Before testing, each
participant received verbal and written instructions that introduced the
task rules for the color and shape task and how they were cued (Fig. 1).
Each trial started with the presentation of a task cue signaling
the relevant task that had to be performed (Fig. 2). The cue was
shown for 250ms before it was covered by a mask for 250ms fol-
lowed by a blank screen for 150ms. Altogether the cue-stimulus in-
terval (CSI) lasted 650ms. The mask could help participants to focus
on the cue and to initiate task preparation before the target stimu-
lus was presented. The procedure with cue masking was similar to
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the task rules in the color/shape task-switching paradigm of Experiment 1A. The color task cue was a white triangle pointing upward, and the shape task cue was
a white triangle pointing downward. The target stimuli were four rectangular bars (color=red, green; shape=high, wide). LEFT and RIGHT corresponds to pressing the left and right
button on the response pad, respectively. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 2. Experiment 1A. Schematic timeline of a trial in the color/shape mixed-task block.
Verbruggen et al. (2007) and Schneider (2016). Immediately after the
CSI, a target stimulus appeared and remained on screen until the partic-
ipant gave a response or until the maximal RT of 1500ms was exceeded.
A correct response would trigger the next trial after an inter-trial inter-
val (ITI) of 500ms. If participants failed to respond within 1500ms, the
message “Too slow” appeared for 2000ms. If participants pressed the
wrong key, an error warning was displayed for 2000ms. At the end of
each block or after an incorrect response, each participant received in-
dividual feedback indicating their mean RTs and the number of consec-
utive correct trials.
Participants were asked to fully engage in the experiment with
the incentive to finish early if they made no error in 200 consec-
utive trials of the mixed-task block. Once a par
ticipant gave the wrong response or did not respond in time (counted
as incorrect) in the mixed-task block, the attempt of reaching zero er-
rors was aborted and the participant would receive practice trials in the
color and the shape task for additional task-rule practice. The experi-
ment lasted until a participant performed 200 consecutive trials in the
mixed-task block without mistakes. In case a participant did not manage
to reach zero errors, the experiment was terminated after 90min.
2.2. Results
We examined individual differences in task switching using a novel
procedure that encouraged participants to make zero mistakes. We
first conducted conventional ANOVAs on
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response times (RTs) and error rates (ERs) averaged across conditions
from all mixed blocks. In addition, we employed Generalized Linear
Mixed-effects Models (GLMMs; Bolker et al., 2009) using the gamma
link-function in order to study individual differences in RTs from the
mixed-task block with the maximum number of responses (MAX block).
Each individual can have a different number of trials in their MAX
block. GLMMs can take into account imbalanced data and typically pro-
vide better model fits than conventional ANOVAs. In order to guard
against model overfitting, we employed information criteria (AIC, BIC)
that penalize more complex models. The fixed effects of a GLMM re-
flect group-level performance whereas random effects reveal individual
variability in RTs. We hypothesized that participants may vary in their
task-switching performance, particularly in the MAX blocks, since par-
ticipants may be differently motivated.
2.2.1. Mean RTs and ERs from all mixed blocks
The first trial of each block was discarded from the analyses be-
cause it cannot be classified as a switch or a repeat trial. Error tri-
als were also excluded from the RT analysis. Since participants had
to start a new block whenever
they made an error, it was not necessary to exclude trials after an er-
ror. Mean RTs and ERs for each participant (see Fig. 3) were entered
into separate three-way ANOVAs with repeated measurements on fac-
tor Task (color, shape), Trial transition (repeat, switch) and Congruency
(congruent, incongruent).
For mean RTs, we observed three statistically significant main ef-
fects. There was a significant main effect of Task, F(1, 57)=22.30,
p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.28. Participants responded on average more slowly in
the shape task (577ms) than in the color task (553ms). In addition,
there was a significant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 57)=30.69,
p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.35, with slower mean responses for incongruent trials
(581ms) compared to congruent trials (550ms).
More importantly and in line with previous findings, we found a
statistically significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 57)=76.53,
p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.57. Responses were slower in trials with task-switch-
ing (591ms) compared to trials with task repetition (540ms), indicat-
ing an average RT switch cost of +51ms. The switch cost was larger
in the incongruent trials (SC=switch - repeat=+61ms, p<.001)
than in the congruent trials (SC=+41ms, p=.015), indicating a sta-
tistically significant interaction between Trial transition
Fig. 3. Results of Experiment 1A averaged across all mixed blocks. Mean RTs (top panels) and ERs (bottom panels) for Task (color, shape), Trial transition (repeat, switch) and Congruency
(congruent, incongruent). Violin plots with superimposed boxplots show averaged data of N=58 participants. Each violin plot represents the estimated distribution of mean data in the
corresponding condition. Bold horizontal bars and boxes denote medians and interquartile ranges, respectively. Black dots represent outliers whereas black diamonds and error bars denote
means and standard errors, respectively.Note: ** p<.01; * p<.05; ns=non-significant.
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and Congruency, F(1, 57)=5.99, p=.018, η⁠2⁠p =0.10. No other inter-
action effects were statistically significant.
For ERs, we found a significant main effect of Congruency, suggest-
ing more errors in incongruent trials (8.08%) than in congruent tri-
als (2.62%), F(1, 57)=43.63, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.43. As in the RT analy-
sis, we found a statistically significant main effect of Trial transition,
suggesting more errors in switch trials (6.26%) than in repeat trials
(4.44%), F(1, 57)=13.08, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.19, indicating a significant
ER switch cost of +1.82%. The ER switch costs were larger in the incon-
gruent condition (SC=+3.52%, p<.001) than in the congruent con-
dition (SC=+0.13%, p=.904), F(1, 57)=10.37, p=.002, η⁠2⁠p =0.15.
No other effects reached statistical significance.
The results of the ANOVAs indicate that significant RT and ER switch
costs occurred, even though participants were asked to make no er-
rors. However, it is likely that most participants only fully engaged
in the mixed block where they achieved their maximum number of
consecutive correct responses. Therefore, we considered only perfor-
mance in the MAX blocks in the following analysis. We tried to identify
how much participants differed in their best-performing block (i.e., the
MAX block): Did some participants perform better than others, e.g., by
not making a single error in their MAX block? Did individuals who were
fully engaged and highly motivated in their MAX block also have zero
switch costs?
2.2.2. MAX blocks
Participants had different numbers of correct trials in their MAX
block (Appendix A). Only a few valid observations were available for
poorly performing participants but up to 200 observations for some ex-
ceptional participants, leading to imbalanced numbers of observations
across conditions (M=109 trials, ranging between 5 and 200 trials).
Similarly, the individual analyses of RT switch costs showed that indi-
vidual switch costs ranged between −75ms to +251ms, with an aver-
age switch cost of +35ms in the MAX block (Appendix A).
2.2.2.1. Best-performing participants in MAX blocks We found that after
an average practice of 1233 trials (ranging from 540 to 1956) before
the MAX block, a total of 16 participants from our sample were able to
finish the experiment early by completing 200 consecutive trials in the
MAX block without making a single error. Among the 16 participants,
we identified 9 best-performing participants or best performers who
learned to switch between tasks without error after relatively few trials
(mean number of trials before MAX=1102 trials, ranging from 540 to
1656 trials). Each of these 9 participants had no significant RT differ-
ences between task-switch and task-repeat trials (mean switch cost of
+5ms). For comparison, the remaining 7 participants, who also made
no errors in the MAX block, responded more slowly in task-switch than
in task-repeat trials (mean switch cost of +42ms). Note that among
these 7 participants, a two-sample t-test showed that Participant 7 per-
formed significantly faster in task-switch trials compared to task-repeat
trials showing a negative switch cost of −48ms (p=.011, Cohen's
d=0.37). We did not consider Participant 7 as one of the best per-
formers in the present study because we aimed to identify participants
who would show the same accuracy and speed in task-switch as in
task-repeat trials.
In order to study whether the 9 best-performing participants var-
ied in RTs over the course of their MAX block, we split the 200 trials
from their MAX blocks into the first and second 100. The correspond-
ing averaged RT data were then submitted to a four-way repeated-mea-
sure ANOVA with factor Trial transition (task-repeat, task-switch), Con-
gruency (congruent, incongruent), Task (color, shape) and Block half
(first, second). The results showed non-significant main effects of Trial
transition (F<1) and Congruency (F=3.67, p=.092). Best perform-
ers showed non-significant switch costs (+5ms) and congruency effects
(+13ms). Importantly, the results indicated non-significant effects in-
volving Block half, suggesting that the 9 best-performing participants
showed non-significant change in RTs between the first and the second
half of the MAX blocks. The switch costs were +7ms in the first half
and +4ms in the second half. The congruency effects were +8ms in the
first half and+18ms in the second half.
2.2.2.2. RT analyses and individual differences in MAX blocks In order
to study RTs and individual task-switching performance in MAX blocks,
we employed Generalized Linear Mixed-effects Models (GLMMs). Al-
though participants had different numbers of responses in their MAX
block, hierarchical models can accommodate imbalanced RT data and
provide estimates of group-level fixed effects as well as individual ran-
dom effects (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). The latter can capture
individual differences in task-switching performance.
We tested models with full factorial design (fixed effects for Task,
Congruency and Trial Transition, and their interactions) and identified
the most parsimonious model that converged (GLMM 1A.2 in Appendix
B). This model had by-subject random effects for mean RT (intercepts),
Trial transition (slopes) and Task (slopes).
In order to report p-values for fixed effects, we used the asymp-
totic Wald test where each “t value” is computed as a ratio between
estimated and standard error. In the following we report these t -val-
ues and the corresponding p -values without degrees of freedom (Bates,
Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The fixed effects of the GLMM
in Experiment 1A suggest that responses were 24ms slower in the
shape task (598ms) compared to the color task (574ms), t=6.52,
p<.001; 28ms slower in switch trials (600ms) compared to repeat
trials (572ms), t=5.85, p<.001; and 18ms slower in the incongru-
ent condition (595ms) compared to the congruent condition (577ms),
t=6.18, p<.001. The two-way interaction between Task and Trial
transition was statistically significant (t=−2.75, p=.006), suggesting
larger switch costs when switching to the color task (+34ms) than
switching to the shape task (+23ms). There also was a statistically sig-
nificant three-way interaction between Task, Trial transition and Con-
gruency (t=2.69, p=.007), suggesting that switch costs were larger in
the color-congruent condition (+37ms), compared to the color-incon-
gruent condition (+30ms), the shape-incongruent condition (+25ms)
and the shape-congruent condition (+20ms).
Fig. 4 illustrates that participants varied considerably in their mean
RTs (Intercepts) from the overall average. Participant 49, for example,
was on average 203ms faster and Participant 55 was 327ms slower
than the grand average RT in the sample (586ms). The 9 best-per-
forming participants also showed a considerable spread in their mean
RTs. For example, Participant 46 responded significantly faster
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Fig. 4. Experiment 1A. Illustration of by-subject random effects for RTs. Subject numbers on the left identify individual participants. Dotplots in the three top panels show random in-
tercepts and random slopes of the best performers (no errors and non-significant switch costs), and the dotplots in the three bottom panels illustrate the random effects of the other
participants/subjects. Dotplots in the left column illustrate individual deviations (dots) and 95% confidence interval (horizontal error bars) from the estimated mean RT of the N=58
participants. The dotplots in the middle and right column show individual deviations from the fixed effect of Trial transition and Task (random slopes). The solid vertical lines centered
on zero in the left, middle and right panels correspond to the estimated mean RT (Intercept=grand mean RT of 586ms), mean switch cost (Trial transition; switch - repeat=+28ms),
and mean task difference (Task; shape - color=24ms), respectively. The dashed vertical line in the middle and right plot indicate zero switch cost and zero task difference, respectively.
Please note the differently scaled x-axes (in ms) in the left and right panels.
and Participant 19 responded significantly slower than the total aver-
age.
The individual differences in RT switch costs (Trial transition), how-
ever, were less pronounced and appeared to be independent of indi-
vidual RTs (Pearson's r=−0.07). We found clear deviations from the
group-average switch costs of +28ms in only 3 out of 58 partici-
pants: Participant 7 (−47ms), Participant 2 (+34ms), and Participant
17 (+48ms). Not surprisingly, the 9 best-performing participants (Fig.
4; top middle panel) showed smaller switch costs deviating only mar-
ginally from the mean switch cost (solid vertical line) and none of them
deviated significantly from zero switch costs (dashed vertical line). In
comparison, 12 out of 49 other participants (Participant 2, 11, 12, 17,
24, 28, 30, 37, 40, 43, 50, and 57) showed switch costs that were signif-
icantly larger than zero.
Similarly, the individual differences in RT task-difference showed
a random pattern and appeared to be independent of individual RTs
(Pearson's r=0.02) as well as individual switch costs (Pearson's
r=−0.02). None of the best-performing participants showed a sig-
nificant difference be
tween color and shape tasks and only five of the other participants (Par-
ticipant 9, 16, 29, 31, 40) showed a significant difference between color
and shape tasks.
2.3. Discussion
Experiment 1A investigated individual differences in task switch-
ing using a novel experimental procedure. We conducted both conven-
tional ANOVAs and mixed-effect models to study their task-switching
performance. We observed a significant RT switch cost of +51ms av-
eraged across all trial conditions, mixed blocks, and participants. How-
ever, RT switch costs were reduced to +28ms in the MAX block. We
attribute the reduction in the task-switch costs to increased engage-
ment and motivation, possibly relating to more efficient task-switch-
ing strategies in the MAX blocks. It may be argued that switch costs
in the MAX blocks and in all mixed blocks were relatively small com-
pared to other task-switching studies. Schneider (2017), for example,
found significant switch costs of +128ms for a response-time limit
of 2500ms. With a narrower response window of 1500ms, our
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participants experienced more time pressure and were more motivated
to respond faster in each trial. This may have attenuated RT differences
between switch and repeat trials.
We studied individual performances in MAX blocks in order to iden-
tify participants who maximally engaged in task switching over many
consecutive trials. We found that 16 participants managed to complete
the experiment early by making no error in 200 consecutive trials in
the mixed-task block (100% accuracy). Among these 16 participants, 9
(about 15% of the total sample) showed non-significant RT switch costs.
We labelled these high-performing individuals as best performers. The
other participants made an error and/or showed significant switch costs
in their MAX block, even after practicing the tasks for over an hour.
Surprisingly, Participant 7 showed a negative RT switch cost. This par-
ticipant might have employed a strategy that led to faster responses in
task-switch compared to task-repeat trials.
As expected the GLMM on RTs in the MAX block indicates individ-
ual differences in task-switch costs although the differences were rela-
tively small throughout our sample of participants. It appears that the
best performers showed task-switching characteristics that were compa-
rable to most other participants. However, the task-switching procedure
in Experiment 1A was extremely demanding because it encouraged the
highest level of accuracy (100% accuracy). A participant who completed
the 200 trials without making a single mistake had to maintain full at-
tention. Therefore the 9 best performers were quite exceptional because
they were not only 100% accurate in their switching performance over
200 trials, but also performed task-switch trials as quickly as task-repeat
trials. According to the failure-to-engage account (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen
& De Jong, 2010), these participants were able to fully engage in each
upcoming trial for an extended period of time. In contrast, other par-
ticipants seemed less capable during task-switching. They occasionally
failed to engage in the task and therefore made mistakes and/or showed
significant switch costs in their MAX block.
The identification of best performers supports previous studies on
individual differences in task-switching (Stoet & Snyder, 2003, 2007),
multi-tasking (Medeiros-Ward et al., 2014; Strayer & Watson, 2012;
Watson & Strayer, 2010, 2012) and related cognitive tasks (Haff &
Rouder, 2017, 2018). In these studies some participants learned tasks
better than others, suggesting superior cognitive abilities or higher mo-
tivation.
It is possible that the best-performing participants also had superior
cognitive control. In an additional ANOVA we split the MAX block into
the first and last 100 trials. The results indicated that these participants
did not show significant switch costs or even congruency effects in ei-
ther half. Previous research suggested that reduced switch costs may re-
flect high-level task engagement (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong,
2010), and reduced congruency effect may reflect better control of at-
tention that is maintained across trials (Bugg & Braver, 2016). We con-
clude that the best performers were highly engaged in each trial for an
extended period demonstrating better cognitive control.
It is also possible that by using a novel experimental procedure
where participants were encouraged to make no mistake, best per-
formers were more strongly motivated by the zero-error policy. In
order to investigate whether the best performers also show excep-
tional switching perfor
mance in more conventional task-switching paradigms, where partic-
ipants are allowed to make mistakes, we invited the best performers
to take part in follow-up Experiment 1B. We tried to establish “su-
per-switchers” among the best performers. “Super-switchers” should
show higher accuracy and no switch costs, independent of experimental
conditions. In a second follow-up, Experiment 1C, we compared the 9
best performers with 9 control participants who had made frequent er-
rors in Experiment 1A.
3. Experiment 1B
Experiment 1B was designed as a follow-up on the best-performers
in Experiment 1A. We sought to study the switching abilities of the best
performers by using the same color/shape tasks in a more conventional
experimental setting where participants can make mistakes without hav-
ing to start again. In particular, we investigated the cue-stimulus in-
terval (CSI) and inter-trial interval (ITI) as critical factors that may af-
fect the task-switching performance of the best performers. We tried to
identify “super-switchers” among the best performers - individuals who
would show superior task-switching performance across different condi-
tions and paradigms.
Experiment 1A had a fixed CSI of 650ms and a fixed ITI of 500ms
in every trial. It therefore remained unclear whether CSI or ITI was crit-
ical for their task-switching performance. According to both the FTE ac-
count and the task-set reconfiguration account, the CSI is considered as
more important for reducing residual switch costs because task-set re-
configuration occurs during this interval (De Jong, 2000; Mayr & Kliegl,
2003; Poboka et al., 2014; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). One possible ex-
planation for the reduced switch costs is that best performers may be
more efficient in their advance preparation during the CSI. According to
the proactive interference account, residual switch costs should be re-
duced for longer ITIs because interference from a previous task set de-
cays gradually over time (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran et al.,
2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; but see Horoufchin, Philipp, & Koch, 2011;
Grange, 2016). This leads to the alternative explanation that interfer-
ence may have decayed more quickly in the best performers. It is also
possible that both accounts play a role in task-switching because switch
costs can be the result of both preparation and interference from the
previously executed task set (Vandierendonck et al., 2010).
We sought to investigate these possibilities in the best performers
by systematically varying the CSI from 0 to 650ms and the ITI be-
tween 150ms and 500ms in different blocks. We made three predic-
tions. First, we predicted that a longer CSI (650ms) and a longer ITI
(500ms) in Experiment 1B should result in no significant switch costs
in best performers, replicating their individual results in Experiment 1A.
Second, according to the failure-to-engage and the task-set reconfigura-
tion account we predicted that the task-switching performance should
be significantly impaired if the CSI was reduced from 650ms to 0ms.
Similarly, according to the proactive interference account, we predicted
increased task-switching costs if the ITI was reduced from 500ms to
150ms. Third, we postulated that “super-switchers” should be resilient
to these changes, showing no errors and no switch costs independent of
the manipulation of CSI and ITI.
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3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Subjects
Nine participants who were identified as the best performers in Ex-
periment 1A (3 males, 6 females) were invited back to take part in this
follow-up experiment approximately one month later. Participants were
paid £10 each for taking part.
3.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
All aspects of the stimulus presentation were identical to the color/
shape task-switching paradigm as used in Experiment 1A, except for a
change of the task cue in the two composite conditions without CSI. In
the conditions without CSI, the filled white triangles (30mm each side)
were replaced by a bigger isosceles triangle with a base length of 29cm
and side lengths of 24cm. In each trial, both the cue and the target stim-
ulus were located at the center of the screen. The target stimulus always
appeared inside a triangle which served as the task cue.
3.1.3. Procedure
Different from the color/shape paradigm used in in Experiment 1A,
both cue-stimulus interval (CSI: 0, 650ms) and inter-trial interval (ITI:
150, 500ms) were systematically manipulated within participants lead-
ing to four task-switching conditions: Condition 650–500, 650–150,
0–500, and Condition 0–150 (see Fig. 5). In a pilot study we found that
performing in the conditions with CSI 650ms before the condition with
CSI 0ms helped participants to better recall the task rules, reducing the
error rates in the more difficult Condition 0–500 and 0–150. The en-
tire experiment lasted approximately 1h. In each condition, there was a
block of 50 trials with the color task, then a block of 50 trials with the
shape task, followed by a block of 200 trials with randomly mixed tasks.
Participants always completed the two single-task blocks to practice the
task rules before starting the mixed-task blocks. In this experiment, the
zero-error policy was not applied because we wanted to study partici-
pants' performance in a more conventional task-switching paradigm.
3.2. Results
The first trial of each mixed-task block, error trials and the trial
following an error were excluded from the RT analy
sis. In contrast to Experiment 1A where the mixed block expired once
an error was made, in Experiment 1B all trials that immediately fol-
lowed an error were excluded because it is not possible to classify them
as task-switch or task-repeat trials. We also excluded trial n if it had the
same cue-stimulus combination as the preceding trial n - 1 because in
conditions with CSI 0ms cue and target stimulus were presented simul-
taneously and a participant could simply repeat the same response as
previous trial without cognitive processing of the task. After exclusion
of these trials, the number of valid trials ranged between 665 and 794
per participant, with 156 to 199 RT measurements in each condition.
We first conducted a conventional ANOVA on mean RTs and ERs. In ad-
dition, we applied GLMMs to capture individual differences among the
best-performing participants.
3.2.1. Mean RTs and ERs
Mean RTs and ERs are depicted in Fig. 6. They are collapsed across
ITIs which had no significant effects on performance (see Appendix
A for all conditions). RTs and ERs were analyzed separately using a
three-way ANOVA with repeated measures on factor Trial transition
(task-repeat, task-switch), CSI (0ms, 650ms), and ITI (150ms, 500ms).
There was a significant main effect of CSI, F(1, 8)=271.75, p<.001,
η⁠2⁠p =0.97, with longer mean RTs for CSI 0ms (755ms) compared to
CSI 650ms (462ms). There was a significant main effect of Trial tran-
sition, F(1, 8)=34.54, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.81, with longer mean RTs for
task-switch trials (630ms) than task-repeat trials (587ms), participants
showing a significant RT switch cost of +43ms.
More importantly, we observed that the RT switch costs decreased
by 76ms when the CSI was increased from 0 (+81ms, p=.004) to
650ms (+5ms, p=.833), indicating a significant interaction between
Trial transition and CSI, F(1, 8)=12.55, p=.008, η⁠2⁠p =0.61. No sta-
tistically significant effects associated with ITI were found (F<1 for all
effects associated with factor ITI).
Error rates, collapsed over ITIs, are shown in the panels at the bot-
tom of Fig. 8 (see Appendix A for all conditions). We did not observe
any statistically significant effects for ERs. This shows that best perform-
ers were relatively successful at maintaining a constant ER across trials
and conditions, suggesting that effects of RTs are not confounded by ac-
curacy.
Similar to Experiment 1A, we split the trials in the mixed block
into two halves and analyzed the RT data accordingly. The corre-
sponding RT data were then submitted to a four-
Fig. 5. Experiment 1B. Schematic depiction of the four combinations of cue-stimulus interval CSI (CSI 650ms, 0ms) and inter-trial interval (ITI 500ms, 150ms) in the color/shape
task-switching paradigm.
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Fig. 6. Experiment 1B. RTs (top panel) and ERs (bottom panel) are shown in separate
box/violin plots for repeat and switch trials across CSIs (0ms, 650ms). Black dots repre-
sent outliers whereas black diamonds and error bars denote means and standard errors,
respectively.Note. **p<.01, ns=non-significant.
way repeated-measure ANOVA with factors Trial transition (task-repeat,
task-switch), CSI (0ms, 650ms), ITI (150ms, 500ms) and Block half
(first, second). Again, we found a significant interaction between Trial
transition and CSI, F(1, 8)=16.66, p=.004, η⁠2⁠p =0.68.
Participants did not show significant RT switch costs in the con-
dition with CSI 650ms, but showed significant costs in the condition
with CSI 0ms. Block half did not significantly interact with Trial tran-
sition (F<1) and CSI (F=1.63, p=.237). We did not find a signifi-
cant three-way interaction between Trial transition, Block half and CSI
(F<1), suggesting that switching performance did not differ between
the two halves of the block. For CSI 650ms, switch costs were +7ms
in the first half and +6ms in the second half. In contrast, for CSI 0ms
RT switch costs were +95ms in the first half and +83ms in the second
half. No other effects reached statistical significance.
3.2.2. Individual differences
We conducted GLMMs to capture individual differences among the
best-performing participants. The raw RT data were modelled by
gamma distributions in a full factorial design for fixed effects and
different by-subject random effects. We identified the most parsimo-
nious model (see
GLMM 1B.3 in Appendix B). Trial transition, CSI and ITI, and all interac-
tions were entered as fixed effects. The intercept, the main effect of CSI
and ITI and the interaction between CSI and Trial transition featured as
by-subject random effects.
The fixed effects are consistent with the ANOVA results and are
summarized in Appendix B. Responses were significantly faster in CSI
650ms (471ms) compared to CSI 0ms (762ms), t=−92.58, p<.001.
RT switch costs were smaller for CSI 650ms (+4ms) compared to CSI
0ms (+79ms), t=−20.80, p<.001. Moreover, there were no signifi-
cant differences between switch costs for ITI 150ms (+40m) and ITI
500ms (+43ms), t=0.92, p=.360.
The by-subject random effects explained considerable variance. The
top panel of Fig. 7 shows large individual deviations from the grand
mean RT (Intercept). When comparing Fig. 4 with Fig. 7 regarding mean
RTs (Intercepts), we found that most best performers were consistent in
their mean RTs across experiments. For example, Participant 46 was the
fastest best-performer in Experiment 1A as well as 1B. Participant 19
and 41 who were the slowest best-performers in Experiment 1A were
again slower in the present experiment. However, Participants 13 who
was slightly slower in Experiment 1A performed faster in the present ex-
periment.
The bottom panel of Fig. 7 shows individual deviations between dif-
ferent CSIs and ITIs. Participant 38 and 45 showed improved RT per-
formance when the CSI was increased to 650ms, while Participant 19,
41, and 46 showed less improved performance. Participant 41 and 45
showed faster responses in ITI 500ms than in ITI 150ms, while other
participants performed more slowly in ITI 500ms.
Fig. 7 also shows individual differences in RT switch costs (middle
panels). Participants showed different deviations from the mean switch
costs (solid vertical line) and zero switch costs (dashed vertical line) in
the CSI 650ms and in the CSI 0ms condition. Seven participants did not
significantly deviate from zero switch cost in the CSI 650ms condition
whereas Participant 13 and 46 had switch costs significantly higher than
zero. In contrast, all participants had switch costs significantly higher
than zero in the CSI 0ms condition.
3.3. Discussion
The results of Experiment 1B show that on average the best perform-
ers developed RT switch costs when the CSI was reduced to 0ms but
showed non-significant switch costs for both RTs and ERs when the CSI
was 650ms, confirming the results in Experiment 1A. This finding is
in line with studies that identified preparation effects on task-switch-
ing costs (Merian et al., 2000; Altmann, 2004; Schneider, 2016, 2017).
However, in none of these studies switch costs were eliminated even
when preparation intervals were longer than 2000ms (e.g., Meiran et
al., 2000). Here, the best performers prepared very efficiently within a
CSI of 650ms, showing no significant switch costs except for Participant
13 and 46.
Importantly, the best performers were only affected by CSI. An in-
crease of ITI from 150ms to 500ms did not improve their switching per-
formance. This is inconsistent with the proactive interference account
where longer ITIs should lead to reduced switch costs (Allport et al.,
1994; Meiran et al., 2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; but see Horoufchin
et al., 2011; Grange, 2016). We conclude that the reduced switch
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Fig. 7. Experiment 1B. Illustration of by-subject random effects. Subject IDs on the left correspond to the Subject IDs in Experiment 1A. Top panel: Dotplot illustrates individual devia-
tions (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal error bars) from mean target RT (Intercept=group-average target RT of 617ms, indicated by the solid vertical lines centered on
zero). Middle panel: Dotplots illustrate individual deviations (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal error bars) from the mean switch costs in CSI 650ms (+4ms) and CSI 0ms
(+79ms) collapsed over ITIs. The dashed vertical lines in the plots of the middle panel indicate zero switch cost in each condition. Bottom panel: Dotplots illustrate individual deviations
(dots) and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal error bars) from the main effect of CSI (mean RT in CSI 650ms - mean RT in CSI 0ms=−292ms,) and ITI (mean RT in ITI 500ms - mean
RT in ITI 150ms=+7ms). Please note the different RT scales on the x-axes across plots.
costs in best-performers can be attributed to efficient task preparation
during CSIs.
Why can best performers prepare more efficiently for a task or re-
configure a task set during relatively short CSIs whilst other partici-
pants cannot? In the present experiment, best performers showed re-
duced switch costs, even without the zero-error policy. This result seems
to suggest that the best performers maintained superior switching abili-
ties independent of the zero-error policy. However, not all best perform-
ers showed trait-like switching abilities. For example, Participant 13 and
46 varied considerably in terms of switch costs between Experiment 1A
and 1B. Since many other participants in Experiment 1A also performed
well, showing no mistakes or non-significant switch costs in their MAX
block, we need further evidence that can set apart best performers from
other participants.
In order to address this question we studied best performers in
different task-switching paradigms. Yehene and Meiran (2007) sug-
gested that participants should exhibit general task-switching abilities
across paradigms. Experi
ment 1C was conducted to compare the general task-switching abilities
of best performers with a control group.
4. Experiment 1C
The purpose of this follow-up experiment was to compare the
best-performers with a control group in conventional task-switching
paradigms using different tasks and without applying the zero-error pol-
icy. We hypothesized that best performers may have better trait-like
switching abilities if they show significantly smaller or even no switch
costs across different tasks and conditions compared to controls.
In addition, we employed Raven's advanced progressive matrices
(APM, Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) in order to test whether both
groups of participants differed in general intelligence. Studies suggested
that general intelligence affects the efficacy of cognitive control
(Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy & Neubauer, 2014; Friedman et
al., 2006) which plays an important role in task-switching. We there
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fore hypothesized that group differences in task switching may be re-
lated to group differences in general intelligence.
4.1. Methods
4.1.1. Subjects
Nine best-performing participants (3 males and 6 females,
M=23.89years, SD=1.96) were invited to take part in this follow-up
experiment approximately two months after Experiment 1A. We also in-
vited 9 other participants from Experiment 1A as controls (1 male and 8
females, M=23.00years, SD=1.80). The control participants are high-
lighted by an open triangle next to the Subject ID in Fig. 4. We did
not select the worst-performing participants as controls because they
might not sufficiently engage in each trial. The participants in the con-
trol group matched the best performers in terms of mean RTs (Inter-
cepts; see Fig. 4) but made frequent mistakes even though they had
practiced the color/shape task in thousands of trials (M=1626 trials,
ranging from 1137 to 2215 trials) in Experiment 1A. They had a MAX of
<50 trials (M=13 trials, ranging from 10 to 45 trials) in their experi-
mental session over 90min. Participants were paid £10 each for taking
part.
4.1.2. Apparatus, tasks and stimuli
The apparatus for stimulus presentation and response collection was
identical to Experiment 1A and 1B.
4.1.2.1. Color/shape paradigm All aspects of the color/shape
task-switching paradigm were the same as in Experiment 1A, except
that we did not apply the zero-error policy.
4.1.2.2. Shape/filling paradigm The shape/filling task was the same as
the task used by Stoet, O'Connor, Conner and Laws (2013, Experiment
1). In the shape task, participants were asked to press a left button if a
diamond-shaped target appeared (30.7mm each side) and a right but-
ton if a square-shaped target appeared (30.7mm each side), ignoring
the dots inside. In the filling task, participants were asked to press the
left button for two vertically arranged dots and the right button for
three vertically arranged dots, ignoring the surrounding shape. All
stimuli were printed in yellow and presented on the top or bottom of a
rectangular yellow frame (70×80mm). Participants responded to the
surround shape when the target was presented in the upper part of the
frame and responded to the filling dots when the target was presented
in the lower part. The “Shape” and “Filling” cues were visible through-
out each trial to remind participants of the currently relevant task. The
inter-trial interval was 800ms.
4.1.2.3. Letter/number paradigm The letter/number task was the same
as the task used by Rogers and Monsell (1995, Experiment 1). Partici-
pants received a letter/number pair in each trial. The task was to either
categorize the letter as a vowel or consonant, or to categorize the digit
as being odd or even. The odd numbers were drawn from the set 3, 5,
7, 9, and the even numbers were drawn from the set 2, 4, 6, 8, dis-
played on screen in yellow sans-serif with font size 22. The consonant
letters were drawn from the set G, K, M, R and vowel letters from the
set A, E, I, U, also displayed on screen in yellow sans-serif with font
size 22. To help participants to keep track of the task sequence, the let-
ter/number pair was presented on a 2∗2 yellow grid (5cm each side),
moving around clockwise inside the grid. Participants were told to re-
spond to the letter only when the letter/number pair was shown in one
of the top two cells,
and to respond to the number only when the pair was shown in one
of the bottom two cells. In the number task, participants were asked to
press the left button if the number was odd and the right button if the
number was even. In the letter task, participants were asked to press the
left button if the letter was a vowel and the right button if the letter was
a consonant. The inter-trial interval was 150ms.
4.1.2.4. Intelligence test Raven's advanced progressive matrices (Raven
et al., 1998) were used to measure non-verbal reasoning ability. The
Raven advance test is the most difficult of the Raven's Matrices tests,
and was designed to differentiate among people with “superior intellec-
tual ability” (Raven et al., 1998). This paper-and-pencil test has 48
items, consisting of 2 sets, with 12 diagrammatic puzzles in Set I (for
practice) and 36 puzzles in Set II (for data analysis, with a full score of
36). Each item in the test contains a figure with a missing piece, and
participants are required to select one out of eight possible answers to
fit the missing space from the pattern.
4.1.3. Procedure
Participants in the control group completed all three paradigms.
Best performers completed only the shape/filling paradigm and the let-
ter/number paradigm. Since the color/shape task was the same as the
Condition 650–500 in Experiment 1B, we re-used the data of the best
performers from this condition only. As before, participants had up to
1500ms to make a response after target onset. If no or an incorrect re-
sponse was given within 1500ms, error feedback appeared on screen for
1 sec. In each paradigm, participants completed a 50-trial block of each
single task to practice the task-rules, followed by a 200-trial mixed block
with both tasks intermixed. Note that the tasks were randomly mixed in
the mixed block of the color/shape and the shape/filling paradigms but
not in the number/letter paradigm. After completing the task-switching
paradigms, all participants took part in a one-hour Raven's intelligence
test.
4.2. Results
Data preprocessing was the same as in Experiment 1B. After exclu-
sion of trials, the number of valid trials ranged between 486 and 583 for
the nine best-performing participants and between 376 and 519 for the
nine participants in the control group. Next, we conducted conventional
ANOVAs on mean RTs and ERs. In addition, we applied GLMMs to con-
firm group effects and to capture individual differences in RTs.
4.2.1. Task-switching analyses
Mean RTs and ERs are summarized in Appendix A. Two four-way
ANOVAs with mixed effects were conducted on the mean RTs and
ERs of each participant. Group (best-performing, control) served as be-
tween-subjects factor whereas Trial transition (task-repeat, task-switch),
Congruency (congruent, incongruent) and Paradigm (color/shape,
shape/filling, and letter/number) were within-subjects factors.
For mean RTs, we observed a significant main effect of Group, F(1,
16)=9.12, p=.008, η⁠2⁠p =0.36. Best-performing participants (605ms)
had significantly faster responses compared to the participants in the
control group (695ms). There was a significant main effect of Trial
transition, F(1, 16)=133.89, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.89. Task-switch trials
(707ms)
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were slower compared to task-repeat trials (592ms), indicating a sta-
tistically significant RT switch cost of +115ms. There was a signifi-
cant main effect of Congruency, F(1, 16)=58.32, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.78.
Incongruent trials (662ms) were slower compared to congruent tri-
als (638ms), indicating a congruency effect of +24ms. Participants
performed differently across paradigms, F(2, 32)=69.71, p<.001,
η⁠2⁠p =0.81. Post-hoc comparisons, corrected after Holm (Holm, 1979),
revealed that participants were significantly faster in the color/shape
paradigm (509ms) compared to the letter/number (698ms) and shape/
filling paradigm (742ms).
Trial transition significantly interacted with Paradigm, F(2,
32)=28.14, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.64. Post-hoc analyses revealed that the
switch costs were significant in the letter/number (SC=switch− re-
peat=+155ms, p<.001) and shape/filling paradigms
(SC=+149ms, p<.001), but not in the color/shape paradigm
(SC=+42ms, p=.160). Trial transition also interacted with Congru-
ency, F(1, 16)=5.36, p=.034, η⁠2⁠p =0.25. Post-hoc analyses revealed
that switch costs
were smaller in congruent trials (SC=+107ms, p<.001) compared
to incongruent trials (SC=+123ms, p<.001). Importantly, Trial tran-
sition significantly interacted with Group, F(1, 16)=5.43, p=.033,
η⁠2⁠p =0.25. As shown in Fig. 8, best performers (SC=+92ms, p=.002)
showed smaller switch costs compared to the control group
(SC=+138ms, p<.001). We did not find a significant interaction be-
tween Group and Paradigm (F<1). Other interaction effects involving
Group were not significant.
For error rates, all four main effects were statistically significant. We
observed a significant main effect of Group, F(1, 16)=9.62, p=.007,
η⁠2⁠p =0.38, as best-performing participants made fewer errors (2.70%)
compared to participants in the control group (7.84%). There was a
significant main effect of Trial transition, F(1, 16)=16.19, p<.001,
η⁠2⁠p =0.50. Participants made more errors in task-switch trials (6.33%)
compared to task-repeat trials (4.20%), indicating a significant ER
switch cost of +2.13%. There was a significant main effect of Con-
gruency, F(1, 16)=35.20, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.69. Participant made more
errors in incongruent tri
Fig. 8. Results of Experiment 1C. Mean RTs (top panels) and ERs (bottom panels) for repeat and switch trials are shown in separate box/violin plots for Group (best-performing, control)
and in separate panels for Paradigm (color/shape, shape/filling, letter/number). Black dots represent outliers whereas black diamonds and error bars denote means and standard errors,
respectively.Note. *** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05; ns=non-significant.
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als (8.10%) compared to congruent trials (2.44%), indicating a sig-
nificant congruency effect of +5.66%. Error rates were also different
across paradigms, F(2, 32)=9.57, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.37. Post-hoc analy-
ses indicated that color/shape paradigm (7.60%) had more errors com-
pared to the letter/number paradigm (4.09%) and shape/filling para-
digm (4.12%).
Trial transition significantly interacted with Congruency, F(1,
16)=18.35, p<.001, η⁠2⁠p =0.53. Post-hoc analyses showed that the
switch costs were larger in incongruent trials (SC=+4.20%, p=.007)
than in congruent trials (SC=+0.07%, p=.961). As illustrated in Fig.
8, Group significantly interacted with Trial transition, F(1, 16)=4.83,
p=.043, η⁠2⁠p =0.23. Post-hoc analyses showed that best performers
(SC=+0.97%, p=.478) had smaller ER switch costs compared to
the control group (SC=+3.29%, p=.049). In addition, Group signifi-
cantly interacted with Paradigm, F(1, 16)=6.49, p=.004, η⁠2⁠p =0.29.
Post-hoc analyses revealed that best performers had significantly fewer
errors (3.11%) than the control group (12.09%) in the color-shape par-
adigm (p<.001), whereas there was no significant group difference in
the letter/number paradigm and shape/filling paradigm. Other interac-
tion effects involving Group did not reach statistical significance.
4.2.2. Individual differences
In order to study individual differences in RTs, we analyzed the
RT measurements from each trial using GLMMs as in Experiments 1A
and 1B. We compared the most parsimonious model with Group ef-
fects (GLMM 1C.3) with a corresponding model without Group effects
(GLMM 1C.2) in order to determine whether factor Group and its inter-
actions improved the model fit. In other words, the model comparison
tested whether the distinction between best performers and controls was
an important predictor of RTs.
The GLMM 1C.2 turned out to be more parsimonious than 1C.3, sug-
gesting that the distinction between best-performers and controls ex-
plained little additional variance in RTs (Appendix B). In GLMM 1C.2,
Trial transition, Congruency and Paradigm, and their interactions were
treated as fixed effects. The random effects captured individual devia-
tions from the grand mean RT (Intercept), from the main effect of Par-
adigm and from the interaction between Trial transition and Paradigm.
The fixed effects without Group effects mirror the ANOVA results on
RTs (Appendix B). On average participants showed significant switch
costs (+118ms, t=32.52, p<.001). Switch costs were smaller in the
color/shape paradigm (+44ms) than in the letter/number (+160ms;
t=−32.68, p<.001) and shape/filling paradigm (+150ms;
t=−36.17, p<.001).
The by-subject random effects explained considerable RT variance.
Fig. 9 shows individual differences in mean RTs (top panel), with
both groups of participants showing significant deviations from the
grand mean RT. Seven of the best performers were significantly faster
than average compared to three fast-performing participants in the
control group. Comparing Fig. 9 with Fig. 4 in terms of individual
mean RTs (Intercepts) indicates that most participants performed con-
sistently in terms of mean RTs across both experiments. In the con-
trol group, for example, Participant 52 was the slowest whereas Par-
ticipants 18 and 50 were the fastest, ranking similarly in terms of
mean RTs in both experiments. In the group of best-performers, Partic-
ipant 19, who was slower than the sample average RT in Experiment
1A, also responded more slowly in Experiment 1C. In addition, we found
that five of the best performers, Participant 27, 38, 45, 46 and 56, re-
sponded faster than the sample average in both experiments. Participant
13, however, varied considerably in mean RT. This participant was one
of the slowest best performers in Experiment 1A but the fastest partici-
pant in Experiment 1C.
Fig. 9 also shows that across the three paradigms, some of the partic-
ipants showed significant deviations from the mean switch costs (mid-
dle panel). Importantly, in the color/shape paradigm, all of the best per-
formers except for Participant 13 were close to zero RT switch costs
(dashed vertical line), while participants in the control group showed
switch costs significantly larger than zero with the exception of Par-
ticipants 8 and 33. Both groups of participants demonstrated simi-
lar switching performance with significant deviations from zero switch
costs (dashed vertical lines) in the letter/number and shape/filling para-
digm, although best performers exhibited somewhat more homogenous
random effects in those paradigms.
Note that best performers and controls deviated significantly from
the mean RT difference between paradigms (the bottom panel of Fig.
9), suggesting that participants from both groups varied considerably in
their RTs between tasks and conditions.
4.2.3. Raven's intelligence scores
The intelligence scores for best performers and controls were com-
pared in a two-sample t-test. We found a statistically significant dif-
ference between groups, t (16)=2.52, p=.023, Cohen's d=1.19. The
best performers had on average significantly higher intelligence scores
(Mean=28.33, ranging from 17 to 34) compared to the control group
(Mean=22.33, ranging from 14 to 29).
4.3. Discussion
In line with our prediction, Experiment 1C confirmed that, even
though the zero-error policy was not applied, best performers showed
better task-switching performance than participants in the control
group. The results of the ANOVAs suggest that best performers had on
average shorter RTs and reduced ERs than controls across different par-
adigms. Moreover, the analyses suggest that the best-performing partic-
ipants had on average smaller RT and ER switch costs compared to the
controls. The difference in task-switching performance between the two
groups may be related to their difference in general intelligence sores,
supporting previous studies that have showed a relationship between
cognitive abilities and general intelligence (Benedek et al., 2014; Fried-
man et al., 2006).
Although the comparison between models with and without Group
effects suggests that the distinction between best performers and con-
trols was not important, a significant group difference for RT switch
costs was detected in the color/shape paradigm: 8 out of 9 best per-
formers had smaller and non-significant switch costs. In contrast, only
2 out of 9 controls showed non-significant switch costs. This confirms
our finding from Experiment 1A where the best performers also showed
more consistent and more efficient task-switching in this paradigm.
In the shape/filling and the letter/number paradigms, however, the
best-performing participants showed significant RT switch costs sim-
ilar to the control group. In the
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Fig. 9. Experiment 1C. Illustration of by-subject random effects for GLMM on RTs. Subject IDs on the left correspond to participants as in Experiment 1A and 1B. Top panel: The dotplot
shows individual deviations (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (horizontal error bars) from mean RTs (Intercept=grand mean RT of 664ms, as indicated by the solid vertical line
centered on zero). Middle panel: The dotplots from left to right illustrate individual deviations from mean switch costs in the color/shape (+44ms, as indicated by the solid vertical
line centered on zero), letter/number (+160ms) and shape/filling (+150ms) paradigm, respectively. The dashed vertical line in each plot indicates zero switch cost for each paradigm.
Bottom panel: The dotplots illustrate individual deviations from the RT difference between color/shape and letter/number paradigm (mean difference=194ms, as indicated by the solid
vertical line centered on zero), and between color/shape and shape/filling paradigm (mean difference=230ms). Please note the different RT scales on the x-axis across plots.Note. C/
S=Color/shape paradigm, L/N=Letter/number paradigm, S/F=Shape/filling paradigm.
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shape/filling and letter/number paradigm both the cue and the target
stimulus were presented simultaneously leaving no or little opportunity
to prepare for the upcoming task. As suggested by the failure-to-engage
and the task-set reconfiguration account, the cue-stimulus interval (CSI)
is important because the relevant task-set can be re-configured within
a certain CSI (De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Mayr & Kliegl,
2003; Poboka et al., 2014; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). The critical ad-
vantage of the best performers may have been that they were able to
efficiently prepare each task-set following a cue, suggesting better cog-
nitive control. This may be related to their higher general intelligence
scores. However, consistent with the results in Experiment 1B, their ad-
vantage disappeared as soon as the cue-stimulus interval was reduced to
zero. We therefore suggest that none of the best-performers qualify as
“super-switchers”.
5. General discussion
In an experiment and two follow-ups we examined individual differ-
ences in task switching. In a reasonably large sample of participants, we
tried to identify “super-switchers” who were expected to exhibit excep-
tional task-switching abilities across different conditions and paradigms.
In Experiment 1A we applied a “zero-error policy” to motivate par-
ticipants to maintain full attention and high engagement during a block
of randomly mixed tasks. We found reduced switch costs in their MAX
block. In addition, we found large individual differences in participant's
mean RTs and ERs. We identified the 9 best-performing participants in
our sample who showed no errors and no significant switch costs. We
reasoned that their superior performance may be due to increased mo-
tivation to engage in task switching, superior task-switching abilities, or
both. In two follow-up experiments, in which participants could make
mistakes without the need to restart a block, the best performers were
still able to eliminate switch costs in trials with a CSI of 650ms but not
in trials with a CSI of 0ms. Only in conditions with CSIs, did best per-
formers show better task-switching performance than controls. The re-
sults of the two follow-up experiments suggest that the reduced switch
costs in best performers is unlikely to be attributed to increased moti-
vation or task engagement because in both follow-up experiments there
was less pressure to avoid mistakes.
Alternatively, best performers may have task-switching abilities
and/or efficient strategies that can be applied across different
task-switching paradigms (cf., Yehene & Meiran, 2007). However, there
was no convincing evidence that the best performers had trait-like “su-
per-switcher” abilities. GLMMs revealed that best performers shared RT
characteristics with many other participants. In the two follow-ups, we
confirmed that best performers were able to eliminate switch costs when
there was a cue-stimulus interval of 650ms. We attribute this superior
performance to more efficient task preparation following a cue.
The reduced switch costs of the best performers support the fail-
ure-to-engage account of task-set reconfiguration (De Jong, 2000;
Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell,
1995) suggesting that full reconfiguration of the task-set during a CSI
of 650ms is achievable, at least for some participants. In contrast,
our findings on best performers seem incompatible with the two-stage
theory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al.,
2001). This theory posits that task-rule reconfiguration can only start
after onset of a target stimulus which would make it impossible for par-
ticipants to eliminate switch costs. As a result, each participant should
have significant residual switch costs across different conditions.
The identification of best performers addresses the general question,
also posed by Haff and Rouder (2017, 2018), whether everyone shows
the same “true effect” in cognitive tasks. We found that some individuals
showed significant switch costs while a few individuals did not display
any switch costs in the pre-cued conditions. In previous studies it was
reported that even after extended preparation times (>2000ms), signif-
icant residual switch costs were found (Meiran et al., 2000; Poboka et
al., 2014; Rogers & Monsell, 1995; Schneider, 2016, 2017). Several au-
thors have tried to increase the motivation of participants so that they
would prepare for upcoming tasks more efficiently but those studies had
limited success in eliminating switch costs (Lien et al., 2005; Meiran &
Chorev, 2005; Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002, Schneider, 2016, 2017;
see however Verbruggen et al., 2007). These results suggest that, on av-
erage, switch costs can be reduced but not eliminated by task prepara-
tion so that residual switch costs should always remain. Although this
may be true for most individuals, it ignores individual differences in
task-switching because participants may be motivated differently, and
may have different cognitive abilities and strategies. Striking evidence
of individual differences has been reported in a variety of cognitive
tasks (Haff and Rouder, 2017, 2018; Medeiros-Ward et al., 2014; Stoet &
Snyder, 2003, 2007; Strayer & Watson; 2012; Watson & Strayer, 2010).
We studied individual differences in task switching. We first con-
ducted ANOVAs on averaged RTs and ERs and found significant mean
switch costs, confirming the results of previous task-switching experi-
ments. In addition, we employed general linear mixed models (GLMMs)
on single-trial RTs in order to study how individuals varied in their
performance across conditions, paradigms, and experiments. We identi-
fied best performers, who seemed more capable in task-switching, and
showed minimal switch costs in some experimental conditions. Never-
theless, their superior performance did not generalize to conditions and
paradigms with simultaneous presentation of cue and target stimulus.
Here they showed individual differences and significant switch costs
similar to a control group. We argue that analyzing averaged perfor-
mances may overlook individual variability across conditions and par-
adigms, and may be responsible for the commonly observed residual
switch costs in previous task-switching studies (e.g., De Jong, 2000;
Merian et al., 2000; Altmann, 2004; Schneider, 2016, 2017). It is possi-
ble that although significant residual switch costs were reported, a good
number of participants may have successfully eliminated switch costs in
various conditions.
Further studies are needed to identify what gave the best perform-
ers an advantage in task switching over controls. The Raven's intel-
ligence test suggests that best performers had slightly higher general
intelligence, which may be related to improved executive functioning
and cognitive abilities. More specifically, best performers may have de-
veloped more efficient cue encoding, rule activation, or both. Com-
pared to a paradigm with “two-to-one cue-task mappings”, task switch-
ing with simpler “one-to-one cue-task mappings” should simplify per-
ceptual processing of multiple
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cues. With simpler one-to-one cue-task mappings best performers might
quickly translate a task cue (i.e., a solid triangle) into a “task-name me-
diator” (e.g., “color” in trials with triangle pointing upward), followed
by earlier task-goal and task-rule retrieval. This is consistent with the
idea of mediated retrieval (Logan & Bundesen, 2004; Logan & Schneider,
2006). It is also possible that best performers employed other more
specific switching strategies: Based on the cue-task association hypothe-
sis proposed by Arbuthnott and Woodward (2002), the best perform-
ers may have established stronger associations between task cues and
task representations after extensive practice of the color/shape tasks. As
soon as a cue is presented, the relevant task feature and category-re-
sponse mappings are immediately activated in working memory, so that
responses in task-switch trials are as fast and accurate as responses in
task-repeat trials. As mentioned before, another explanation may be that
participants with no or reduced switch costs did not “fail to engage”
(De Jong, 2000; Lindsen & De Jong, 2010; Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers
& Monsell, 1995). In contrast, participants with switch costs “failed to
engage” in task-set reconfiguration, effectively performing task switch-
ing according to the two-stage theory (Mayr & Kliegl, 2003; Rogers &
Monsell, 1995; Rubinstein et al., 2001). These possibilities may be ad-
dressed in future research.
The difference in general intelligence between best performers and
controls has to be interpreted with caution. Previous studies indicated
a strong relationship between information updating and general intel-
ligence (Benedek et al., 2014; Friedman et al., 2006), suggesting that
higher intelligence scores may be related to improved goal-updating
capabilities, resulting in fewer errors and lower switch costs in task
switching. However, there are multiple sub-processes involved in prepa-
ration that may collectively lead to improved task-switching perfor-
mance. Thus, it remains unclear whether the group differences in gen-
eral intelligence can fully explain group differences in task-switching
performance.
6. Conclusion
In the present paper, we investigated individual differences in
task-switching. By focusing on individual response times and error rates,
we identified best-performing participants who showed superior switch-
ing performance in conditions with cue-stimulus intervals. However, in
two follow-up experiments the best-performing participants exhibited
no superior task-switching in conditions and paradigms with simultane-
ous presentation of cue and target, performing similar to a group of con-
trol participants. The advantage of the best performers may be related
to faster than average processing of cue information and rapid task-set
reconfiguration before target onset. This advantage suggests better cog-
nitive control which may be related to their higher general intelligence
scores. Although we were unable to identify “super-switchers” in our
sample, we suggest that a more detailed study of individual switch-
ing performances may help to reveal individual differences in switching
strategies and executive control.
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